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author Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>2016-03-09 08:48:16 +0700
committer Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>2016-03-09 08:48:16 +0700
commit7881c69f0b5c2a12a0d1d58e28e0bfab12f361ef (patch)
treef9e86b247b3befdd9a3b21327c5a52a65688f460 /network
parent95f8121dcca0ab33a34dc8db809c6873f97f3fde (diff)
downloadslackbuilds-7881c69f0b5c2a12a0d1d58e28e0bfab12f361ef.tar.gz
slackbuilds-7881c69f0b5c2a12a0d1d58e28e0bfab12f361ef.tar.xz
network/sockstress: Removed (no longer build and maintained).
Signed-off-by: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'network')
-rw-r--r--network/sockstress/README6
-rw-r--r--network/sockstress/README-NEW261
-rw-r--r--network/sockstress/slack-desc19
-rw-r--r--network/sockstress/sockstress.SlackBuild103
-rw-r--r--network/sockstress/sockstress.info10
5 files changed, 0 insertions, 399 deletions
diff --git a/network/sockstress/README b/network/sockstress/README
deleted file mode 100644
index 6907fcc507..0000000000
--- a/network/sockstress/README
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-sockstress is a collection of TCP socket stress methods
-that attempt to deplete limited kernel resources.
-
-After installation, the source code is placed in
-/usr/src/sockstress-0.0.1
-You can modify payloads there.
diff --git a/network/sockstress/README-NEW b/network/sockstress/README-NEW
deleted file mode 100644
index 5211db5fe5..0000000000
--- a/network/sockstress/README-NEW
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-Sockstress is a user-land TCP socket stress framework that can
-complete arbitrary numbers of open sockets without incurring the
-typical overhead of tracking state. Once the socket is established,
-it is capable of sending TCP attacks that target specific types of
-kernel and system resources such as Counters, Timers, and Memory
-Pools. Obviously, some of the attacks described here are considered
-"well known". However, the full effects of these attacks is less
-known. Further, there are more attacks yet to be
-discovered/documented. As researchers document ways of depleting
-specific resources, attack modules could be added into the sockstress
-framework.
-
-The sockstress attack tool consists of two main parts:
-
-1) Fantaip: Fantaip is a "Phantom IP" program that performs ARP for
-IP addresses. Fantaip is provided by the unicornscan package.
-To use fantaip, type 'fantaip -i interface CIDR',
-Ex., 'fantaip -i eth0 192.168.0.128/25'.
-This ARP/Layer 2 function could optionally be provided by other means
-depending on the requirements of the local network topology. Since
-sockstress completes TCP sockets in user-land, it is not advisable
-to use sockstress with an IP address configured for use by the kernel,
-as the kernel would then RST the sockets. Fantaip is not strictly
-required as the use of a firewall to drop incoming packets with rst
-flag can be used to achieve the same goal and prevent the kernel from
-interfering with the attack vector. However, you may end up DoSing
-yourself using the local firewall method.
-
-2) Sockstress: In its most basic use, sockstress simply opens TCP
-sockets and sends a specified TCP stress test. It can optionally send
-an application specific TCP payload (i.e. 'GET / HTTP/1.0' request).
-By default, post attack it ignores subsequent communications on the
-established socket. It can optionally ACK probes for active sockets.
-The attacks take advantage of the exposed resources the target makes
-available post handshake.
-
-The client side cookies, heavily discussed in blogs, news and
-discussion lists, is an implementation detail of sockstress, and not
-strictly necessary for carrying out these attacks.
-
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-The attack scenarios
-
-Every attack in the sockstress framework has some impact on the
-system/service it is attacking. However, some attacks are more
-effective than others against a specific system/service combination.
-
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-Connection flood stress
-Sockstress does not have a special attack module for performing a
-simple connection flood attack, but any of the attack modules can be
-used as such if the -c-1 (max connections unlimited) and -m-1
-(max syn unlimited) options are used. This would approximate the
-naptha attack by performing a connection flood, exhausting all
-available TCB's as described in the CPNI document in section 3.1.1
-
-Example commands:
-
- fantaip -i eth0 192.168.1.128/25 -vvv
- sockstress -A -c-1 -d 192.168.1.100 -m-1 -Mz -p22,80 -r300 \
- -s192.168.1.128/25 -vv
-
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-Zero window connection stress
-Create a connection to a listening socket and upon 3 way handshake
-(inside last ack) send 0 window.
-
- syn -> (4k window)
- <- syn+ack (32k window)
- ack -> (0 window)
-
-Now the server will have to "probe" the client until the zero window
-opens up. This is the most simple of the attack types to understand.
-The result is similar to a connection flood, except that the sockets
-remain open potentially indefinitely (when -A/ACK is enabled). This
-is described in the CPNI document in section 2.2. A variation here
-would be to PSH a client payload (i.e. 'GET / HTTP/1.0') prior to
-setting the window to 0. This variation would be similar to what is
-described in the CPNI document section 5.1.1. A further variation
-would be to occasionally advertise a TCP window larger than 0, then
-go back to 0-window.
-
-Good against:
-
-services that have long timeouts Example commands:
-
- fantaip -i eth0 192.168.1.128/25 -vvv
- sockstress -A -c-1 -d 192.168.1.100 -m-1 -Mz -p22,80 -r300 \
- -s192.168.1.128/25 -vv
-
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-Small window stress
-Create a connection to a listening socket and upon 3 way handshake
-(inside last ack) set window size of 4 bytes, then create an ack/psh
-packet with a tcp payload (into a window that is hopefully large
-enough to accept it) with a window still set to 4 bytes. This will
-potentially cause kernel memory to be consumed as it takes the
-response and splits it into tiny 4 byte chunks. This is unlike a
-connection flood in that memory is now consumed for every request
-made. This has reliably put Linux/Apache and Linux/sendmail systems
-into defunct states. It is also effective against other systems.
-We expect this has similar effects to what is described in the CPNI
-document in the second to last paragraph of page 17.
-
-Look at the payload.c file in the sockstress source. Look for the
-hport switch statement. In that section you can specify payloads to
-be sent to specific ports. It is most effective to send a payload
-that will generate as large of a response as possible
-(i.e. 'GET /largefile.zip').
-
-Good against:
-
-services that contain initial connection banners services that accept
-an initial request and send a large response (for example a GET
-request against a large web page, or file download) Example commands:
-
- fantaip -i eth0 192.168.1.128/25 -vvv
- sockstress -A -c-1 -d 192.168.1.100 -m-1 -Mw -p22,80 -r300 \
- -s192.168.1.128/25 -vv
-
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-Segment hole stress
-Create a connection to a listening socket and upon 3 way handshake
-(inside last ack) send 4 bytes to the beginning of a window, as
-advertised by the remote system. Then send 4 bytes to end of window.
-Then 0-window the connection. Depending on the stack, this could cause
-the remote system to allocate multiple pages of kernel memory per
-connection. This is unlike a connection flood in that memory is now
-consumed for every connection made. This attack was originally created
-to target Linux. It is also quite effective against windows. This is
-the attack we used in our sec-t and T2 demos. We expect this has
-similar effects to what is described in the CPNI document in section
-5.2.2 5th paragraph and section 5.3.
-
-Good against:
-
-Stacks that allocate multiple pages of kernel memory in response to
-this stimulus Example commands:
-
- fantaip -i eth0 192.168.1.128/25 -vvv
- sockstress -A -c-1 -d 192.168.1.100 -m-1 -Ms -p22,80 -r300 \
- -s192.168.1.128/25 -vv
-
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-Req fin pause stress
-Create a connection to a listening socket. PSH an application payload
-(i.e. 'GET / HTTP/1.0'). FIN the connection and 0-window it. This
-attack will have very different results depending on the
-stack/application you are targeting. Using this against a Cisco 1700
-(IOS) web server, we observed sockets left in FIN_WAIT_1 indefinitely.
-After enough of such sockets, the router could no longer communicate
-TCP correctly.
-
-Look at the payload.c file in the sockstress source. Look for the
-hport switch statement. In that section you can specify payloads to be
-sent to specific ports. It is important that you send a payload that
-will look like a normal client to the application you are interacting
-with. Against our cisco 1700, while using this attack it was important
-to attack at a very slow rate.
-
-Example commands:
-
- fantaip -i eth0 192.168.1.128/25 -vvv
- sockstress -A -c-1 -d 192.168.1.100 -m-1 -MS -p80 -r10 \
- -s192.168.1.128/25 -vv
-
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-Activate reno pressure stress
-Create a connection to a listening socket. PSH an application payload
-(i.e. 'GET / HTTP/1.0'). Triple duplicate ACK.
-
-Look at the payload.c file in the sockstress source. Look for the
-hport switch statement. In that section you can specify payloads to
-be sent to specific ports. It is important that you send a payload
-that will look like a normal client to the application you are
-interacting with.
-
-Good against:
-
-Stacks that support this method of activating reno or similar
-scheduler functionality Example commands:
-
- fantaip -i eth0 192.168.1.128/25 -vvv
- sockstress -A -c-1 -d 192.168.1.100 -m-1 -MR -p22,80 -r300 \
- -s192.168.1.128/25 -vv
-
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-Other Ideas
-
- fin_wait_2 stress
- Create a connection to a listening socket.
- PSH an application payload that will likely cause the
- application on the other side to close the socket (Target
- sends a FIN). ACK the FIN. Good against: Stacks that don't
- have a FIN_WAIT_2 timeout. large congestion window stress
- shrink path mtu stress
- md5 stress
-
-Effects of the attacks
-
-If the attacks are successful in initiating perpetually stalled
-connections, the connection table of the server can quickly be filled,
-effectively creating a denial of service condition for a specific
-service. In many cases we have also seen the attacks consume
-significant amounts of event queues and system memory, which
-intensifies the effects of the attacks. The result of which has been
-systems that no longer have event timers for TCP communication, frozen
-systems, and system reboots.
-The attacks do not require significant bandwidth.
-
-While it is trivial to get a single service to become unavailable in
-a matter of seconds, to make an entire system become defunct can take
-many minutes, and in some cases hours. As a general rule, the more
-services a system has, the faster it will succumb to the devastating
-(broken TCP, system lock, reboot, etc.) effects of the attacks.
-Alternatively, attack amplification can be achieved by attacking from
-a larger number of IP addresses. We typically attack from a /29
-through a /25 in our labs. Attacking from a /32 is typically less
-effective at causing the system wide faults.
-Exploitation caveats
-
-The attack requires a successful TCP 3 way handshake to effectively
-fill the victims connection tables. This limits the attack's
-effectiveness as an attacker cannot spoof the client IP address to
-avoid traceability.
-
-A sockstress style exploit also needs access to raw sockets on the
-attacking machine because the packets must be handled in userspace
-rather than with the OS's connect() API. Raw sockets are disabled
-on Windows XP SP2 and above, but device drivers are readily available
-to put this facility back into Windows. The exploit is able to be
-executed as-is on other platforms with raw sockets such as *nix and
-requires root (superuser) privileges.
-
-=-=-=-=-=-=
-
-Mitigation
-
-Since an attacker must be able to establish TCP sockets to affect the
-target, white-listing access to TCP services on critical systems and
-routers is the currently most effective means for mitigation.
-Using IPsec is also an effective mitigation.
-
-According to the Cisco Response the current mitigation advice is to
-only allow trusted sources to access TCP-based services.
-This mitigation is particularly important for critical infrastructure
-devices. Red Hat has stated that "Due to upstream's decision not to
-release updates, Red Hat do not plan to release updates to resolve
-these issues; however, the effects of these attacks can be reduced."
-On Linux using iptables with connection tracking and rate limiting
-can limit the impact of exploitation significantly.
diff --git a/network/sockstress/slack-desc b/network/sockstress/slack-desc
deleted file mode 100644
index df47847f01..0000000000
--- a/network/sockstress/slack-desc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# HOW TO EDIT THIS FILE:
-# The "handy ruler" below makes it easier to edit a package description.
-# Line up the first '|' above the ':' following the base package name, and
-# the '|' on the right side marks the last column you can put a character in.
-# You must make exactly 11 lines for the formatting to be correct. It's also
-# customary to leave one space after the ':' except on otherwise blank lines.
-
- |-----handy-ruler------------------------------------------------------|
-sockstress: sockstress (tcp socket stress)
-sockstress:
-sockstress: sockstress is a collection of TCP socket stress methods
-sockstress: that attempt to deplete limited kernel resources.
-sockstress:
-sockstress: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sockstress
-sockstress:
-sockstress: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2008-4609
-sockstress:
-sockstress:
-sockstress:
diff --git a/network/sockstress/sockstress.SlackBuild b/network/sockstress/sockstress.SlackBuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 9f56efb86c..0000000000
--- a/network/sockstress/sockstress.SlackBuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-# Slackware build script for sockstress
-# Happy Birthday Jack! :)
-
-# Copyright Jan 5, 2013 Robert E. Lee, USA
-# All rights reserved.
-#
-# Redistribution and use of this script, with or without modification, is
-# permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
-#
-# 1. Redistributions of this script must retain the above copyright
-# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-#
-# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-# WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO
-# EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-# SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
-# PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
-# OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
-# WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
-# OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
-# ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-
-PRGNAM=sockstress
-VERSION=${VERSION:-0.0.1}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
-TAG=${TAG:-_SBo}
-
-if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
- case "$( uname -m )" in
- i?86) ARCH=i486 ;;
- arm*) ARCH=arm ;;
- *) ARCH=$( uname -m ) ;;
- esac
-fi
-
-CWD=$(pwd)
-TMP=${TMP:-/tmp/SBo}
-PKG=$TMP/package-$PRGNAM
-OUTPUT=${OUTPUT:-/tmp}
-
-if [ "$ARCH" = "i486" ]; then
- SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -march=i486 -mtune=i686"
- LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
-elif [ "$ARCH" = "i686" ]; then
- SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -march=i686 -mtune=i686"
- LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
-elif [ "$ARCH" = "x86_64" ]; then
- SLKCFLAGS="-O2 -fPIC"
- LIBDIRSUFFIX="64"
-else
- SLKCFLAGS="-O2"
- LIBDIRSUFFIX=""
-fi
-
-set -e
-
-rm -rf $PKG
-mkdir -p $TMP $PKG $OUTPUT
-cd $TMP
-rm -rf $PRGNAM-$VERSION ._${PRGNAM}
-tar xvf $CWD/$PRGNAM.tar.gz
-mv $PRGNAM $PRGNAM-$VERSION
-cd $PRGNAM-$VERSION
-rm -fr ._* */._* */*/._*
-chown -R root:root .
-find -L . \
- \( -perm 777 -o -perm 775 -o -perm 750 -o -perm 711 -o -perm 555 -o -perm 511 \) \
- -exec chmod 755 {} \; -o \
- \( -perm 666 -o -perm 664 -o -perm 600 -o -perm 444 -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) \
- -exec chmod 644 {} \;
-
-CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \
-CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \
-./configure \
- CFLAGS=-D_GNU_SOURCE \
- --prefix=/usr \
- --libdir=/usr/lib${LIBDIRSUFFIX} \
- --sysconfdir=/etc \
- --localstatedir=/var \
- --mandir=/usr/man \
- --docdir=/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION \
- --build=$ARCH-slackware-linux
-
-make
-mkdir -p $PKG/usr/bin
-ln -s /usr/src/$PRGNAM-$VERSION/sockstress $PKG/usr/bin/sockstress
-
-mkdir -p $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION $PKG/usr/src/$PRGNAM-$VERSION
-cp -a * $PKG/usr/src/$PRGNAM-$VERSION/
-( cd $PKG/usr/src/$PRGNAM-$VERSION
- mv IOS_NOTES NOTES README doc/* wiki $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION )
-rm -fr $PKG/usr/src/$PRGNAM-$VERSION/doc
-cat $CWD/$PRGNAM.SlackBuild > $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION/$PRGNAM.SlackBuild
-cat $CWD/README-NEW > $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION/$PRGNAM.README-NEW
-
-mkdir -p $PKG/install
-cat $CWD/slack-desc > $PKG/install/slack-desc
-
-cd $PKG
-/sbin/makepkg -l y -c n $OUTPUT/$PRGNAM-$VERSION-$ARCH-$BUILD$TAG.${PKGTYPE:-tgz}
diff --git a/network/sockstress/sockstress.info b/network/sockstress/sockstress.info
deleted file mode 100644
index 21b95ce174..0000000000
--- a/network/sockstress/sockstress.info
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-PRGNAM="sockstress"
-VERSION="0.0.1"
-HOMEPAGE="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sockstress"
-DOWNLOAD="http://downloads.sourceforge.net/osace/sockstress.tar.gz"
-MD5SUM="292ad9f40a472883b34e4dbefe5f6c35"
-DOWNLOAD_x86_64=""
-MD5SUM_x86_64=""
-REQUIRES="unicornscan"
-MAINTAINER="Robert E. Lee"
-EMAIL="robert_at_loveathome.us"