1 files changed, 0 insertions, 41 deletions
diff --git a/system/xen/xsa/xsa217.patch b/system/xen/xsa/xsa217.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1d4eb01f23..0000000000
--- a/system/xen/xsa/xsa217.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Subject: x86/mm: disallow page stealing from HVM domains
-
-The operation's success can't be controlled by the guest, as the device
-model may have an active mapping of the page. If we nevertheless
-permitted this operation, we'd have to add further TLB flushing to
-prevent scenarios like
-
-"Domains A (HVM), B (PV), C (PV); B->target==A
- Steps:
- 1. B maps page X from A as writable
- 2. B unmaps page X without a TLB flush
- 3. A sends page X to C via GNTTABOP_transfer
- 4. C maps page X as pagetable (potentially causing a TLB flush in C,
- but not in B)
-
- At this point, X would be mapped as a pagetable in C while being
- writable through a stale TLB entry in B."
-
-A similar scenario could be constructed for A using XENMEM_exchange and
-some arbitrary PV domain C then having this page allocated.
-
-This is XSA-217.
-
-Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -4449,6 +4449,9 @@ int steal_page(
-     bool_t drop_dom_ref = 0;
-     const struct domain *owner = dom_xen;
- 
-+    if ( paging_mode_external(d) )
-+        return -1;
-+
-     spin_lock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
- 
-     if ( is_xen_heap_page(page) || ((owner = page_get_owner(page)) != d) )